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to avoid rendering decisions that will likely bring the Court into 
conflict with the President, the Congress, the states or the people. 
On the contrary, to do so would be to compromise away in advance 
the one contribution it can best make to government: the integrity 
of its judgments. The actual "final" constitutional resolution of an 
issue will be determined by the extent to which the executive, the 
Congress, the states and the people agree or disagree with the 
Court's interpretation and translate that constitutional judgment 
into limitations on or refinements of the Court's ruling. But that 
resolution is a matter properly out of the Court's control and, 
strictly speaking, should be none of its concern. The Justices 
should-indeed, because of their oaths, must-state what they be-
lieve is a proper interpretation of the law, irrespective of political 
consequences, public perceptions or concern for their own power. 
The Constitution in Conflict implicitly rejects such a view of the 
Court's role in favor of a more self-consciously political role. That 
Professor Burt has taken this position is not of enormous moment. 
That the Supreme Court has made considerations of power and 
politics the centerpiece of its new jurisprudence of "reasoned judg-
ment" is of far greater cause for concern. 
THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS. By 
James W. Ely, Jr.1 New York: Oxford University Press. 
1992. Pp. x, 193. Cloth, $32.50; paper $10.95. 
Carol M Rose 2 
In this small volume James Ely puts forth a careful, wide-rang-
ing and blessedly terse survey of the constitutional treatment of 
property rights over the course of American history. This is not a 
book of constitutional theory, nor is it a book on the theory of prop-
erty rights; and although the author makes a number of interesting 
and informed judgments about the legal events he describes, he does 
not give the reader many explicit clues about the theoretical stance 
from which these comments emerge. Extrapolating from the text 
itself, Ely seems to be working from the perspective of ordinary lan-
guage or ordinary understanding. That is, he appears to be asking 
what most people mean by "property," and then describing the 
I. Professor of Law and History, Vanderbilt University. 
2. Fred A. Johnston Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
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ways that our various governmental institutions treat the relevant 
subjects. 
This common-sense procedure results in a book that challenges 
some conventional presentations of constitutional property law. 
For example, Ely is interested not only in the federal courts, but in 
the whole range of governmental decisionmaking, including state 
judicial decisions and legislation, along with congressional acts and 
regulatory policies. He also moves beyond the conventional focus 
on land as the quintessence of property, and takes up a variety of 
other subjects affecting economic entitlements-taxation, intellec-
tual property, property in slaves (from a time happily now past), the 
regulation of utilities and railroads, the effects of social policies con-
cerning labor relations and discrimination, among others. 
A book so brief necessarily slights some aspects of American 
property history. Readers interested in environmental history may 
look in vain for many issues relating to the management of public 
resources-notably the Federal public lands, so very important in 
the settlement of the West--or the property impacts of various sub-
sidy programs, such as water reclamation projects, agricultural 
price supports, or the highway programs. Similarly, family law en-
thusiasts will not find much about the changing (and sometimes 
not-so-changing)J organization of entitlements within the family. 
Moreover, brevity appears to have dictated that Ely lapse into a 
more conventional presentation in the later pages of the book, 
where the issues often appear as the usual pingpong game between 
the United States Supreme Court and the various governmental ac-
tors that have attempted to regulate property. 
All the same, the book is a very useful survey of past and pres-
ent property rights, and of the political and doctrinal lenses through 
which American law has envisioned property. Those lenses have 
changed over time, and in Ely's book, one sees the gradual resitings 
of constitutional property foci: the odd mix of republicanism and 
mercantilism in the colonial period; the preoccupation with the "ob-
ligation of contracts" clause in the early republic; the shift to the 
commerce clause with all its ambiguities; the laissez-faire and sub-
stantive due process approach of the later nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries; the switch to permissiveness about economic 
regulation in the New Deal and following decades; and the current 
obsession with the "takings" clause, perhaps as a redress to the 
double standard ushered in by the famous footnote 4 in Carolene 
3. For an argument that the widow's share has survived all kinds of changes in estate 
law, see Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: "The Kingdom of the Fathers", 10 J.L. & 
lneq. 137 (1991). 
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Products-a double standard that has treated property rights as 
lower in status than other constitutional rights. 
Ely dispatches this huge history with admirable calm, only in-
frequently taking sides in the great debates represented by these 
massive doctrinal moves. On the most current of these debates-
whether property rights should be restored to a rank of equal status 
with other rights-Ely once again seems to take a kind of ordinary 
language approach. That is, if people call property a "right," he 
seems to find no obvious reason to distinguish this right from 
others, or to treat property rights as particularly subject to regula-
tory whim. Ely thinks that the Constitution's Framers saw prop-
erty as equal in status with other rights, and although he thinks 
there might be modem reasons for greater property regulation than 
once was the case, he still appears to think that a right is a right is a 
right-even if it is a property right. 
What is perhaps more intriguing is the much more radical 
viewpoint implied in the title of Ely's book, and explicitly stated by 
Arthur Lee of Virginia in 1775: that property is "the guardian of 
every other right." This view implies that the Carolene Products 
footnote got the matter exactly backwards: that property is not just 
equal in status with other rights, but takes precedence over all 
others. This is not a view that Ely explores at great length, evi-
dently taking the more moderate position of parity over preferment. 
Nevertheless, it is a view that Arthur Lee's contemporaries ap-
peared to share, and one that has cropped up in various guises 
throughout our jurisprudential history. 
So, is property the guardian of all the others, and of liberty 
more generally? Why might anyone think so? Here, in no particu-
lar order, are some answers, all of which have a newer version as 
well as a perhaps more provocative older version. 
Answer 1. Property protects all other rights, because property 
enables citizens to be independent and hence capable of self-
government. 
In its older form, this view could be encapsulated under the 
rubric of "republican property": property, and especially agricul-
tural property, gives the citizen a safe haven, and this in tum en-
ables him to form independent judgments and to debate and defend 
his views with courage and vigor in the political forum. The repub-
lican property owner is his own man, dependent on no one, and 
hence fit to exercise the franchise and generally take part in the 
polity-and if you are not such a property owner, you should be 
excluded from politics, since you might tum into a potentially dan-
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gerous sycophant.4 I say "own man" advisedly, because it was 
quite consistent with republican property that women, being ex-
cluded in large part from property ownership, were also excluded 
from the franchise. 
The modern form of this argument is quite different, and Ely's 
book touches on it: Property, it is said, does indeed form an essen-
tial basis for the projection of one's own "personhood."5 But what 
follows is not exclusion of the propertyless from politics, but rather 
the view that all citizens should be furnished the necessary modi-
cum of property, so that they too can be sturdy, self-governing 
citizens.6 
A few observations may be in order here. For one thing, the 
modern version does not unambiguously protect property rights, 
since the citizenship-enhancing property that gets distributed to the 
poor will necessarily come from the taxes (and hence assets) of 
those who are better off. For a second thing, the older republican 
property was also not unambiguously pro-property: republican 
property had a certain tolerance of redistribution, since vast dispari-
ties of wealth were thought to disrupt the republican polity, and 
since commercial property (which entailed dependence on other 
trading folk) was never thought to be so significant for indepen-
dence anyway, and hence was thought to be more regulable.7 For a 
third thing, property has no exclusive lock on political indepen-
dence. It has often been rather nervously opined, for example, that 
destitution might make people even more strong-minded and "in-
dependent," since the destitute have no reason for giving a damn. 
One might even think that their unpropertied willingness to revolt 
takes the place of property: it is the guardian of all their other 
rights. 
All the same, no one should think that the "independence" ar-
gument about property is simply a tired antiquity. One might ob-
serve its resurgence in the presidential candidacy of Ross Perot, 
where a number of people seemed to think that the man's great 
wealth made him more sturdy and courageous than other politi-
cians. The idea was that he could speak his mind fearlessly, pre-
cisely because his property made him independent-and hence an 
4. For a description of this position, see Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property 
as Propriety, 33 Nomos 223, 235-37 (1991) and authorities cited therein. 
5. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1982). 
6. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 785-86 (1964); see also Akhil 
Reed Arnar, Republicanism and Minimal Entitlements: Of Safety Valves and the Safety Net, 
II Geo. Mason U. L. Rev. 47 (Winter 1988). 
7. See Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, 33 Nomos 223 (cited in note 4). 
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appropriate man for political office. This is the idea of republican 
property rejuvenated. 
Answer 2. Property protects all other rights, because property 
diffuses political power. 
This argument is heard rather often. Ely cites William Van 
Alstyne on the matter, but he might just as well have quoted Milton 
Friedmans or Friedrich Hayek.9 The basic idea, putting it very 
crudely, is that property is a source of power, and if everyone can 
acquire and hold property, no single institution or set of institu-
tional leaders can gather all the power to itself. Hence private prop-
erty is not only economically decentralizing; it is politically 
decentralizing as well, and prevents the monopolization of power in 
the hands of some central Leviathan. 
The older version of this argument is in a way more interesting, 
since it emerged against a now almost-forgotten set of background 
beliefs, according to which hierarchical control was assumed to be 
necessary for both economic and political life. This was because 
human beings were thought to be so unruly as to require the subor-
dination of the (many) worse to the (few) better. The eighteenth 
century property theorists challenged this set of beliefs, describing 
the market as a self-regulating natural mechanism that effectively 
dispensed with the need for an imposed political discipline.w In-
deed, if "the market" could adjust the unregulated participation of 
huge numbers of human transactions, why did human beings need 
authoritarian ordering at all, economic or political? Hence private 
property, and the interactions of the market, gave the original 
model to the decentralization of political authority. 
Again a caution is in order: Joyce Appleby, an historian 
whose work has thoroughly explored the eighteenth-century polit-
ical hopes for capitalist private property, evidently believes that the 
time for this hope has come and gone. 11 Moreover, one has to won-
der how thoroughly property can diffuse political power when a 
property regime itself depends on a set of political choices; we might 
want to recall, for example, that many of the early capitalist efforts 
were most actively promoted by monarchs.12 On the other hand, 
recent political events have once again shown the power of this set 
8. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 15-16 (U. of Chi. Press, 1962). 
9. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 103-04 (U. of Chi. Press, 1944). 
10. Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 
1790s 7-9, 25-35, 95-97 (N.Y.U. Press, 1984). 
II. ld. at 105. 
12. See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Feder-
alism From the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 74, 80-81, 
86-89 (1989), and authorities cited therein. 
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of ideas; as Ely points out, the move to a free market in the former 
Soviet-dominated world is not just an economic matter, but also at 
least in part a political move, aimed at diffusing power. 
Answer 3. Property protects all other rights, because property 
makes politics boring and unimportant. 
Ely has at least one modem quotation relating to this version 
of property's primacy: it is from Judge Alex Kozinski, who re-
marked that rational people, if forced to the choice, might well 
forego the right to wear obscene slogans on their clothing, in favor 
of the right to build buildings or operate railways.B Given Judge 
Kozinski's prominence on the libertarian lecture circuit, one might 
expect that he himself has rather more sophisticated choices on 
matters of political liberty; but his observation does give the flavor 
of another political argument for property. That argument is that 
property is much more interesting than politics, and hence property 
can entice people away from endless rounds of political battles. 
Why bother to repress other people's liberties, when one can spend 
one's time so much more engagingly in business? 
Here too there is an older version. According to Martin Dia-
mond, this capitalistic distraction from politics is one of the things 
that The Federalist had in mind. An extended commercial republic 
would make property available to all, and that prospect would dis-
arm factions, channelling their efforts away from the usual pursuits 
of murdering each other over honor and religion and the like.I4 
Thus free speech and freedom of worship would be protected by a 
profound indifference to what anyone says about anything-an in-
difference induced by the frenetic pleasures of property-seeking. In-
deed, a few decades later, Tocqueville rather bemusedly reported 
that the idea was working: Americans lusted after commerce so 
mightily that they cared for little else, and, incidentally, hardly 
could speak about religion or ideas at all, except in the most vapid 
and extreme generalizations. Is 
There are several caveats here, too. One comes from modem 
public choice theorists, who tell us that the quest for goodies is in-
deed quite likely to invade the logrolling democratic political pro-
13. At 153, quoting Judge Alex Kozinski, Foreword: The Judiciary and the Constitu-
tion, in James A. Dorn and Henry G. Manne, eds., Economic Liberties and the Judiciary, xvii 
(Geo. Mason U. Press, 1987) 
14. Martin Diamond, The Federalist, in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds., History 
of Political Philosophy 631, 648-49 (Rand McNally, 2d ed. 1972). 
15. Alexis de Tocqueville, 2 Democracy in America 154-57 (frantic pursuit of commerce 
and industry), 71-78 (vast subjects, inflated style of American poetic work), 134 ("religious 
insanity") (Phillips Bradley ed., Knopf, 1966). 
244 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:238 
cess-perhaps even more likely than in hierarchic orders.16 Indeed, 
the political quest for goodies (or "rent-seeking") seems rather eas-
ier than making an honest buck in business, and hence, on this 
cheerless account, political rent-seeking tends to displace produc-
tive business activities.J7 Another caveat comes again from the 
news of our day in Eastern Europe, where the lifting of centralized 
economic regimes seems for the moment to be absorbing some citi-
zens not in the amiable pursuits of money making, but in the much 
deadlier and destructive fixation on settling old ethnic scores. Prop-
erty may distract people from politics, but politics can distract peo-
ple from property, too. 
Answer 4. Property protects all other rights, because property 
symbolizes all other rights. 
This argument may have animated some of the Founders' in-
terest in property, and certainly seems to lurk in Madison's well-
known and almost lyrical description of a great string of rights as 
his "property" -that is, in a "larger and juster meaning" he had 
"property" in his religious beliefs, his opinions, and so on.Js The 
idea here is that property is the symbolic form that human beings 
use to represent all forms of entitlement: you can't think about or 
describe rights of any kind except in metaphors of property, d Ia 
Madison. 
Is there a modern version of this idea? Jennifer Nedelsky, who 
has studied the Federalist conception of property, thinks that the 
notion of property-as-symbol may have some merit, although she 
warns that property is a rather complicated and imperfect stand-in 
for other kinds of rights.I9 And in a very practical way, perhaps 
property's symbolic force animates the incredible touchiness that is 
still set off by the regulation of landed property-particularly physi-
cal invasions of land2o--even though, as Ely points out, land is con-
siderably less important in modern economic life than once was the 
case. 
Assuming for the moment that property does act as the quin-
16. See Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory 
of Groups (Harv. U. Press, 1965). 
17. See Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game, in James M. 
Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seek-
ing Society 16, 31-36 (Texas A&M U. Press, 1980). 
18. James Madison, Property, National Gazette, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in Robert A. 
Rutland, eta!., eds., 14 The Papers of James Madison 266 (U. Press of Va., 1983). 
19. Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: 
The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy 207-08, 247-49 (U. of Chi. Press, 1990). 
20. For major cases on somewhat minor physical invasions see Nol/an v. California 
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 u.s. 419 (1982). 
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tessential symbol for all rights and liberties, it would follow, I sup-
pose, that a weakening of the concept of property in turn would 
weaken the sense of rights altogether. So what? One response 
might be, so much the better: that is, we Americans are too rights-
conscious for our own good, and our entitlement-crazed desire to 
sue everybody can only clog the machinery of economic growth. 
Another response might be that even if property is an important 
symbol of all other rights, why is land the dominating symbol for 
property itself? Suppose, for example, that the leading metaphor in 
our symbolism of rights were not property in land, but property in 
water, in which people do in fact have important entitlements. 
Would our symbolism of rights then lead us to think about rights in 
a figuratively more "fluid" way-making us think that rights bring 
us into contact with other people, and that rights require us to work 
out joint solutions? 
In short, then, maybe property can act as a symbolic stand-in 
for all kinds of rights, but this symbolic role raises questions, too: 
What's so hot about rights-consciousness? And do we need rights-
consciousness in the sense of fixed boundaries? 
All these propositions, then, and no doubt some others as well, 
may lead us to a somewhat muted cheer for property as the "guard-
ian of every other right." To be sure, some of these notions stray 
rather far afield from Ely's down-to-earth book. They relate, how-
ever, not only to the question whether property is a preeminent 
right, but also to a question that Ely does talk about more exten-
sively: whether property enjoys even an equal status with other 
rights. 
Here is the way the preeminence issue raises the parity issue: 
Property may have once been important as the guardian of other 
rights, but if those other rights have come to have more direct con-
stitutional protections, do we really need property rights so much? 
That is, if current interpretations of the Bill of Rights and the great 
Civil War amendments now protect our political and expressive 
rights directly, might property as an indirect protector now safely 
recede to a second rank, somewhat in the way that Carolene Prod-
ucts suggested? 
This question once again goes to the significance of property as 
a political institution rather than as an economic one. Clearly there 
are independent and powerful economic arguments for property, 
since property rights are widely believed to enhance and encourage 
wealth-producing activity. But if property is only about economic 
well-being, and if property is no longer needed as the political 
guardian of other rights as well, then the regulation of property 
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would seem to involve only issues of the levels and distribution of 
total wealth, without implicating fundamental issues of political 
self-rule. 
The foregoing comments assume a few things, of course. For 
example, they assume that the protections of other rights only 
ratchet up, and not down; if our courts can change their mood 
about protecting speech and religion and so on, then property once 
again might become more important as the "guardian of every other 
right." Another and more fundamental thing that these comments 
assume is equally problematic: that one can sort out the political 
from the economic aspects of property. This is a tricky business, as 
Ely notes: one only need contemplate, for example, the property 
interest in a newspaper business, a radio station, or even a sound-
truck. 
The distinction between property rights and other rights is also 
a tricky business if one thinks that a society's overall economic well-
being (or lack thereof) might affect people's willingness to forego 
liberties. If that is the case, then the status of property, sheerly as a 
utilitarian "economic" institution, might affect the overall social 
commitment to political rights. This is an observation that has 
often been made about Weimar Germany, for example; that is, that 
economic fears put political liberties on the auction block.21 More 
recently, it sets the background for the worry that economic distress 
might cause the re-emergence of a new authoritarian regime in the 
former Soviet Union. 
Ultimately, then, property's economic role might be thought 
another reason why property could be the "guardian of every other 
right": Property rights make societies wealthy, and wealthy socie-
ties can enjoy the luxury of liberty. 
So, where do we put our bets? On property as an indirect pro-
tector of all the other rights? Or on the judges as the direct protec-
tors or those rights? Or do we hedge our bets and go with 
redundancy--direct protections plus the indirect protections of 
property rights? Ely of course does not dither much with these 
questions in this useful book, but his comments do bring them to 
the surface, and in so doing suggest that property rights still raise 
vital concerns in our constitutional polity. 
21. See, e.g., A.J. Nicholls, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler 151 (Macmillan, 1968). 
